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An Enduring Fear:
Recent Limitations on the Past
Persecution Ground for Asylum
BY SUSANNAH C. VANCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A t first blush, Svetlana Galina appeared to present a persuasive
asylum claim when the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
reviewed her deportation order in 1999. Galina had lived in Latvia her
whole life, but she was stateless: since she was of Russian Jewish origin
and born in Latvia after its annexation by the Soviet Union, Latvian
laws did not accord her citizenship. Her boss, the head of a Latvian
political party, placed her on a secret list of persons subject to deportation
in 1993.2 Galina found this document at work and noticed that all the
people listed were of Russian Jewish origin. Over the next year she
received menacing telephone calls, her daughter and husband were
assaulted, and finally Galina herself was abducted, tied to a tree, and told
to leave the country. On each occasion, the perpetrators referred to the list
Galina had found at work. Since Galina feared that the attackers themselves
had "official connections," she sought only limited help from the police.
Galina fled to the United States in 1994; her husband followed the next
year.3
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), those aliens who
have suffered past persecution in their country of origin or last residence
and those who have a well-founded fear of future persecution are defined
-M.I.A. 2000, Columbia University; J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky.
I wish to thank Mark von Sternberg, Senior Attorney, Catholic Charities Archdio-
cese of New York, for conversations that greatly assisted in the preparation of this
Note.
Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000).
2Id. at 956-57.
3id.
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independently as "refugees."4 However, a grant of asylum does not flow
directly from satisfaction of the refugee definition, since asylum is a
discretionary remedy.' In other words, an INA refugee may be denied
asylum.6 The governing asylum regulation supplies a double standard for
"past persecution" and "well-founded fear" applicants. Members of the
latter group, as long as they meet the standard set forth in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca and are not affirmatively barred from asylum eligibility by any of
the factors listed in the governing regulation,7 are automatically eligible for
a positive exercise of discretion. Past persecution applicants, on the other
hand, enjoy only a presumption of eligibility for a grant of asylum. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")' may rebut this presump-
' Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101 (a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)
(1997). The U.S. Supreme Court construed the "well-founded fear" standard in
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), concluding that the test does not
require a greater than 50% likelihood of future persecution, but instead that the
applicant merely show a "reasonable possibility" of persecution and a bona fide
fear of such treatment. Id. at 440.
' See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2002). The term "refugee" is defined in two
ways in American asylum law. First, those who are officially designated refugees
by international organizations in camps abroad carry refugee status when they
arrive in the United States; these refugees need not apply for asylum. The second
definition of refugee concerns those who satisfy the refugee definition under the
INA § 101(a)(42). While these persons are statutory refugees, their status does not
support any grant of a visa to remain in the United States. These individuals must
apply for asylum after arriving in the United States. See THOMAS A. ALEINKOFF ET
AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 987 (4th ed. 1998).
However, the core refugee definition applied to both asylum seekers in the United
States and refugees abroad is the same: the individual must possess a well-founded
fear of future persecution if returned to (or forced to remain in) the country of
origin or last residence. Id.
6Although the Attorney General may deny asylum in the exercise of discretion,
the principle of non-refoulement prohibits deportation of individuals who face a
clear probability of persecution-a higher standard than the well-founded fear
showing required for eligibility for asylur--if returned to the country of origin.
The withholding of removal remedy in the U.S. codifies this principle. See
generally KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 80 (2d ed. 2002).
' See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(1) (2002).
' As of March 1, 2003, the INS's immigration processing functions were
transferred to the new Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("BCIS"),
under the authority of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005), signed into
law by President Bush on November 25, 2002. Because this Note assesses
immigration policies predating the shift, it will refer to the agency by its previous
acronym (INS).
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tion by showing that circumstances in the applicant's country of origin have
fundamentally changed such that she would not face a well-founded fear if
returned, or that the applicant has a viable option of relocating to a different
area of the country of origin where she would not face persecution. 9 The
BIA and federal case law indicate that the immigration judge ("IJ") or BIA
may take administrative notice of changes eliminating the well-founded
fear; in order to meet its rebuttal burden, the INS is not required to submit
documentation of changes in country conditions obviating the threat of
persecution.10
In Galina v. INS, the BIA found that the applicant had met her initial
burden of proof by demonstrating past persecution on the basis of her
religion and nationality. The BIA denied Galina's asylum claim, however,
based on administrative notice of an excerpt of the U.S. State Department's
1998 Country Report for Latvia indicating that Latvia had conducted "free
and fair elections" in 1996.1" The Board judged that the report indicated "an
improved human rights situation in Latvia," and that Galina would
therefore no longer face a well-founded fear of persecution if she returned
to the country. 2 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge Richard Posner, reversed the BIA's denial of Galina's claim. Posner
held that the BIA may not give outcome-determinative weight to human
rights reports that are "brief and general, and may fail to identify specific,
perhaps local, dangers to particular, perhaps obscure, individuals."' 3
The facts and procedural history of Galina reveal one of the most
puzzling aspects of asylum adjudications: while the refugee definition as
set forth in international human rights instruments 4 and as incorporated
9 8 C.F.R. § 208(b)(i)(A)-(B) (2002).
" See Kowalczyk v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Vincente
A. Tome, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum
Adjudication, 27 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROBS. 411, 415 (1994) (explaining that the
rationale behind administrative notice is that changes in country conditions
constitute "common knowledge" to an expert fact-finder such as an agency
adjudicator).
" Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 957 (7th Cir. 2000).
'21d"
'3 Id. at 959.
See United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]; United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status ofRefugees, January 31, 1967,606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The
Protocol retained the Convention's conceptual framework, defining refugee status
similarly; however, while the Convention limited its definition of refugees to those
persecuted as a result of events occurring before 1951, the Protocol contained no
2002-20031
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into federal statutes and regulations emphasizes an individualized
assessment of the applicant's well-founded fear of persecution, 5 the final
outcome in asylum proceedings often hinges upon administrative law
judges' interpretations of materials having no specific relationship to the
applicant's claim. Galina dramatizes the risk that uncarefully-drawn
connections between purported political reforms and "life on the ground"
may yield inaccurate results in asylum adjudications. The extenuating
circumstances that render an individual a refugee also frequently deprive
her of evidence showing that, despite broad improvements in political
conditions in her country of origin, she continues to fear mistreatment as
the basis of a protected ground. The United Nations High Commission for
Refugees ("UNHCR") Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Deter-
mining Refugee Status ("Handbook"), designated by the U.S. Supreme
Court as persuasive authority in interpreting the international human rights
instruments on which U.S. asylum law is based, 6 anticipated these
problems of proof. The Handbook suggests that, given refugees' dire
situations, an over-strict application of the requirement of evidence would
thwart the international instruments' purpose. 7 Instead, it argues, objective
support for the applicant's fear should be assessed on the basis of her
account's internal consistency, not on the basis of external materials.1
Nonetheless, as asylum applications have soared in the U.S., IJs have
increasingly looked outside the four comers of the asylum applicant's
claim, seeking corroborative support from sources such as U.S. Department
of Justice human rights reports to assess the credibility of the applicant's
fear. 9 IJs' reliance on U.S. State Department country reports in their
temporal cap on refugee status. See generally A. Roman Boed, Note, Past
Persecution Standard for Asylum Eligibility in the Seventh Circuit: Bygones Are
Bygones, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 147, 154 (1993). While the United States was not a
party to the Convention, it acceded to the Protocol in 1968. See infra Part II.
" The 1951 Convention was a significant departure from previous instruments,
that had defined refugees according to broad classifications of their ethnic or social
groups-not individually. See generally MUSALO ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
16 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,439 n.22 (1987) (stating that the
Handbook"provides significant guidance" in the interpretation ofthe Convention).
17 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
197 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
18Id.
'9 See Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2000) (rebuking the BIA for
giving outcome-determinative weight to U.S. State Department country reports
without scrutinizing the relationship between these reports and the specifics of the
applicant's claim).
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assessment of claims-by no means a new practice-adds an inevitable
realpolitik dimension to the asylum adjudication. The practice permits IJs
to evaluate aliens' claims through the lens of U.S. foreign relations. The
administrative notice mechanism enhances the role of these human rights
reports by allowing Js and the BIA to consider them sua sponte. In
addition, the asylum regulation implemented in 2000,20 which in its
concise statement of purpose incorporated the BIA's holding in In re
N-M-A-, 2 has limited the INS's burden for rebutting the presumption
that past persecution implies a well-founded fear of future similar
treatment. This regulation has facilitated the INS's rebuttal effort by
broadening the array of evidence available to the Service in making its
showing.22 Notably, however, even as the new regulation limits the past
persecution ground, it also provides a significant loophole for unsuccessful
past persecution applicants by expanding the availability of "humanitarian"
asylum grants.23
This Note argues that, despite its broadening of the humanitarian
ground for asylum, the new regulatory scheme challenges both international
law norms and principles of due process by unfairly impeding the path to
asylum for applicants recognized as refugees by the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The applicants most negatively affected by the regulatory
changes--victims of unrepeatable harms (female genital mutilation
("FGM") and forced sterilization or abortion) and applicants fleeing
persecution in the midst of chaotic regime change in their countries of
origin--are refugees for whose welfare Congress has demonstrated
particular concern both historically and over the past decade.24 After
20 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2002).
21 See 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,127 (Dec. 6, 2000) (noting that the regulation
implicitly incorporates In re N-M-A-); see also In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 312 (BIA 1998).
22 See Immigration andNaturalization Service AsylumProcedures, 65 Fed. Reg.
76,127 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codified at 8 C.F.R. Pt. 208). The regulations have
broadened the scope of evidence the INS may use to rebut the presumption by
allowing the Service to demonstrate that changes in the applicant's personal
circumstances--not just changes in country conditions-have negated the
applicant's fear of persecution.
23 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2002). Asylum in general is a discretion-
ary and humanitarian form of relief. The use of the term "humanitarian grant" in
this Note refers to situations in which the Attorney General grants asylum despite
finding no present fear of persecution in the country of origin.
24 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (a)(42) (defining forced
sterilization and abortion as persecution); see also Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization, cited in MUSALO ET AL., supra note 6, at 28 (expressing
2002-20031
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examination in Part II of the international law principles animating the past
persecution ground in American asylum jurisprudence,25 this Note assesses
three significant factors limiting the viability of past persecution as an
independent ground for asylum. Part III explores the BIA holding in In re
N-M-A--, which permits the INS to rebut the presumption in favor of
past persecution applicants merely by demonstrating that the applicant no
longer faces a threat of persecution emanating from the same agent as her
past persecution.26 Part IV considers the effects of the regulation promul-
gated in 2000, which provides that the INS may draw upon changes in an
applicant's personal situation-including her previous subjection to an
unrepeatable form of persecution-to rebut the presumption that the
applicant faces a well-founded fear of future persecution. 7 Part V examines
BIA's use of the administrative notice mechanism to integrate an assess-
ment of the human rights situation in the applicant's country of origin,
often inflected with U.S. foreign policy concerns, into the asylum
adjudication." This Note argues that three urgent concerns---the adherence
of United States asylum law to international human rights instruments, the
procedural due process rights of applicants, and the institutional need for
efficiency and accuracy in the asylum adjudication process-demand
reconsideration of the 2000 regulation.
II. THE ROLE OF THE PAST PERSECUTION
GROUND IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
The INA provides that aliens may qualify as refugees by demonstrating
that they are "unable or unwilling" to return to their countries because of
mission of organization to assist refugees in aftermath of post World War II regime
change).
25 See infra notes 29-92 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 93-146 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13
(2002).
28 See infra notes 177-221 and accompanying text. Recent scholarship has
commented abundantly on the question of whether delay and the use of administra-
tive notice in the asylum review process deny the applicant's due process rights.
See DEBORAH ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 112-50 (1999); see
also Tome, supra note 10, at 411. Therefore, this Note addresses the due process
aspects of administrative notice only in order to demonstrate how this practice
affects the substantive limitations on asylum forming the focal point of the
argument. See infra Part V.
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either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.29 The
United Nations instruments informing U.S. asylum law contain only
prospective tests for refugee status, but evidence of past persecution
frequently provides the factual support necessary for a claim to refugee
status under the instruments. While not mandated by the international
instruments, therefore, the INA's past persecution ground accurately
reflects their logic. The last decade has seen a progressive narrowing of the
eligibility of past persecution refugees for discretionary grants of asylum
in the United States. As a result, today the United States arguably defines
"refugee" more expansively than do the international instruments, but it
provides protective legal status for only a limited subset of these refugees.
A. International Law Underpinnings of the Past Persecution Ground
The past persecution ground for asylum eligibility in the United States
drew its inspiration from both the political forces animating international
refugee instruments, and a careful parsing of the refugee criteria under the
instruments. On the political level, delegates representing the United States
in the drafting of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization
("IRO") insisted on a past persecution ground for refugee status, out of
concern for the plight of Holocaust victims.3" The delegates feared that
political shifts in Germany and Eastern European countries would prevent
victims from claiming refugee status despite the atrocities they endured.3
The American delegation, headed by scholar Louis Henkin, believed that
a fear of return based on purely subjective traumatic memories, absent
objective evidence of a risk of present persecution, should suffice to
classify these victims of atrocious torture as refugees.32 American delegates
were also concerned that, even in the absence of a continuing fear, the
combination of past persecution and a subsequent decision to flee could
sever all meaningful ties between persecuted individuals and their countries
of origin.33 While the United States' proposal prevailed at the IRO
29 Immigration and Nationality Act § 1 101(a)(42).
30 The IRO was founded in 1946, as a U.N. agency dealing with the problem of
post-World War II refugees. Its activities continued until 1951, when the U.N.
Convention supplanted it. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
3-6 (1992).
31 See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 68
(1991).
32 id.
33 Id.
2002-20031
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Convention, the past persecution ground was not included in the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Convention") of
1951, which superseded the IRO Constitution. The U.N. Convention
defines "refugee" prospectively:
[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who: ... owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country....4
The conceptual underpinnings of the past persecution ground in
American refugee law, ironically, may be largely traced to the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol--the very instruments that, facially,
reversed the past persecution ground found in the IRO Constitution. The
Protocol binds signatories to the obligations of the Convention, while
extending the Convention's refugee definition to omit its 1951 time-limit
on refugee status. 35 The Convention does not feature a past persecution
ground, but such a provision would harmonize with the Convention's
individualized test for refugee status that is rooted in the alien's personal
experiences. The U.N. Convention and the IRO Constitution signaled a sea-
change in the means of designating refugees: while previous methods
classified members of ethnic, religious, or racial minorities as refugees on
a group basis, these new instruments focused entirely on individual factors
in making the refugee determination. 36 The Convention's refugee definition
contains subjective and objective elements. First, does the applicant possess
a bona fide fear of persecution; and second, is that fear reasonable and
justifiable in light of the applicant's circumstances? 37 While the subjective
element of the inquiry is "inseparable from an assessment of the personality
34 Convention, supra note 14, at Ch. I, Art. l(A)(2). This citation of the
definition excludes the portions pertaining to stateless persons, as well as a clause
stating that the fear of persecution must result from "events occurring before 1
January 1951." This Note does not assess the asylum claims of stateless persons.
The 1951 cutoff for refugee status in the Convention definition was revoked in the
Protocol, but the Protocol otherwise retained the Convention's refugee definition.
See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 35.
3 Protocol, supra note 14, at Art. 1.
36 HATHAWAY, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that "[t]he essence of refugee status
came to be discord between the individual refugee applicant's personal characteris-
tics and convictions and the tenets of the political system in her country of origin").
37 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 40-42.
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of the applicant," the objective element may be established if the applicant
can demonstrate, "to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his
country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the
definition.. ,.I Under such a standard, a showing of past persecution on
the basis of one of the enumerated grounds would appear to form the
strongest evidence of a well-founded fear of similar treatment in the future.
Indeed, the Handbook, in its discussion of the objective prong of the test,
states, "[i]t may be assumed that a person has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted if he has already been the victim of persecution for one of the
reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention."39
The Convention's Cessation Clauses, surprisingly, provide a second
source of support for the past persecution provision. These clauses identify
when a previously designated refugee loses that status. Their application to
the asylum setting, in which applicants by definition have not been labeled
refugees, may seem inept; however, scholars and courts have looked to the
clauses for guidance in determining when improved country conditions
negate the refugee status of a past persecution victim.4" Under the clauses,
a refugee's designation ends when, inter alia, "the circumstances in
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to
exist."" However, the clauses contain an exception and a limitation
indicating concern that protection for victims of persecution not be
precipitously withdrawn. First, "this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee
falling under section A(l) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling
reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of
the protection of the country of nationality."42 Scholars have interpreted
this exception to the Cessation Clauses as an acceptance of humanitarian
grants of status to prospective refugees who have suffered severe persecu-
tion, or for whom the prospect of returning to a site of trauma inspires
debilitating fear.43 Moreover, the Cessation Clauses, as interpreted in the
38 Id. 40, 42.
391Id. 45.
40 See Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation
ofRefugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
343, 357 (1999) (arguing that changed circumstance cases may be viewed as
cessation cases, since most applicants met the U.N. refugee standard when they
initially fled their countries of origin).
" Convention, supra note 14, at Ch. I, Art. 1(C)(5).
42 Id. Refugees falling under A(1) of the article are those deemed refugees
under the Constitution of the IRO, as well as under other previous refugee instru-
ments ("statutory refugees").
43 PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR 26-28 (2000). This provision
corresponds to the "humanitarian" grant of asylum in U.S. asylum law in cases in
which the severity of the past persecution would cause the applicant to experience
2002-2003]
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Handbook, contain a limitation: the Handbook makes clear that the word
"circumstances" does not refer to mere regime change or social instability,
but only to durable, fundamental, and effective changes in the country of
origin that "remove the basis of the fear of persecution. 4 4 A plain-language
reading of this section of the Handbook indicates a tension between
international law principles and two recent developments discussed below:
a requirement that the feared persecution arise from the same perpetrator
as the past persecution,45 and a provision that changes in personal
circumstances, as well as changes in country conditions, may obviate the
threat of persecution.46
B. The Relationship Between Refugee Status and the Asylum Grant Under
International Law
Under the U.N. Convention, an individual becomes a refugee as soon
as she finds herself outside her country of origin, unable to return due to a
well-founded fear of persecution based on one of the protected grounds.47
Therefore, signatory states must accord to asylum-seekers some protections
contained in the Convention even before immigration authorities adjudicate
their claims to refugee status. International law definitions of refugee status
govern both the most expansive and most restrictive bounds of signatories'
asylum standards, while affording the signatories considerable discretion
within those limits. Parties to the Protocol may grant asylum to any
individual who is a refugee under the Convention.48 On the other hand, the
international instruments place only limited restrictions on signatory states'
capacity to exclude asylum-seeking refugees from their territories. 49 First,
Article 33 of the Convention provides for non-refoulement: signatories may
not expel or return a refugee to a country in which "his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
"other serious harm," falling short of persecution, upon return. See Asylum
Procedures, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) & (B) (2000).
44 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 135.
45 See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312 (BIA 1998).
' See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (2002).
47 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 40.
48 See Delaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII); GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968).
' In the U.S. denials of asylum to those found to be refugees under the statute
traditionally are rare. See Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing
2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02 (1995)).
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ship of a particular social group or political opinion."5 An alien who meets
the higher standard of proof of threatened future persecution under non-
refoulement has the right not to be returned to her country of origin, rather
than just the right to request asylum.5 Second, signatory states must adhere
to due process of law in making individualized asylum determinations.52
Finally, signatories may not expel refugees lawfully in their territory except
on grounds of public order or national security."
C. Implementing an Independent Past Persecution Ground: The 1980
Refugee Act and In re Chen
When the United States acceded to the Refugee Protocol in 1968, U.S.
refugee policy bore the mark of obsolete immigration laws that differenti-
ated among national origin groups through the use of a quota system.
Conditional entry, one of the three mechanisms for admitting refugees
50 See Convention, supra note 14, at Art. 33(1). In order to comply with the
non-refoulement provision, the U.S. in 1980 developed the withholding of removal
remedy. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2002). While a grant of asylum permits the refugee
to accede to legal permanent resident ("LPR") status one year after the grant,
withholding of removal may not be converted into permanent resident status. The
applicant must meet a higher standard to qualify for withholding of removal: she
must demonstrate that she faces a clear probability of future persecution-not
merely a well-founded fear. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,425-30
(1987).
5' Bucur, 109 F.3d at 402-03.
52 See Convention, supra note 14, at Art. 32(2).
53 Id. at Art. 32(1). In practice, this provision provides few protections because
of the large number of asylum applicants who arrive in the U.S. without visas, or
with fraudulent visas, in the hope of declaring their intention to seek asylum once
they reach American soil. Although BIA case law has held that the use of
fraudulent visas or other documentation does not constitute an affirmative bar to
a grant of asylum, illegal entry into the United States does place those refugees
arriving without valid visas, who are not citizens of visa-waiver countries, and who
have not been previously designated as refugees, into expedited removal
proceedings. Under these proceedings, an asylum officer ("AO") may summarily
exclude an alien from the U.S. unless he or she presents a credible fear of
persecution. Since the Convention provides that only refugees lawfully in the
territory shall not be expelled, unless based on national security or public order,
those whose asylum claims follow credible fear interviews are not covered by the
Convention. See generally MUSALO ET AL., supra note 6, at 129-34. See also Matter
of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987) (holding that fraudulent entry into the
United States does make applicant excludable under the Act).
2002-2003]
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lawfully into the country,54 was the most blatantly biased according to
political concerns because it was restricted to aliens fleeing Communism
or the Middle East." Only in 1980 with the passage of the Refugee Act did
the U.S. incorporate the refugee designation principles set forth in the U.N.
Convention, thus aligning U.S. law with its commitments under the
Protocol. 6 In keeping with the "well-founded fear" test, the Act called for
an individualized assessment of refugee status taking into account both the
applicant's subjective fear and objective justifications for that fear."
However, the Refugee Act also broadened the refugee definition under the
Convention in order explicitly to include an applicant's experience of past
persecution as a separate, independent ground for refugee status.58 The past
persecution standard in the Act contained one major internal tension: since
the Convention contained no explicit past persecution ground, how could
the statute be implemented so as to ensure that asylum applicants had not
ceased to be refugees under the Convention's Cessation Clauses during the
time since their experience of persecution? The INS and the Department of
Justice fleshed out this problem over the course of ten years of BIA
jurisprudence, culminating in a 1990 regulation that clarified both the
implementation of the past persecution ground and the relationship between
the statute's refugee definition and the discretionary grant of asylum. 9
A milestone BIA case, In re Chen, grappled with these contradictions.60
In that case, the applicant, a Chinese national, had suffered severe torture
at the hands of public officials throughout his childhood because his father
was a Christian minister. As a result, he was permanently physically
54 At the time of the Protocol's ratification the three refugee protection proce-
dures available in the U.S. were withholding of deportation, conditional entry, and
parole. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 6, at 65.
55 Id.
16 See S. REP. 96-256, at 2 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 142
(indicating that a desire to revoke "discriminatory" refugee policies motivated
passage of the Act); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987)
(noting that bringing U.S. refugee law into conformity with U.S. obligations under
the Protocol was a "primary purpose" of the Act).
" See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1997).
18 Id. It should be noted, however, that the Act requires that the alien be "unable
or unwilling" to return to his home country because of the past persecution.
Therefore, the mere showing of past persecution is not sufficient to merit refugee
status under the Act. Practically speaking, however, it may be assumed that asylum
applicants are unwilling to return to their country of origin.
59 Id.
601n re Chen, 20 1. &N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989).
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handicapped and harbored suicidal urges. Chen advanced his application
solely on the basis of this past persecution. For the first time, the BIA gave
real content to the past persecution ground in the asylum adjudication
process, stating, "[P]ast persecution and a well-founded fear of persecution
are alternative methods of establishing eligibility for refugee status ....
[Once an applicant] establishes that he has been persecuted in the past for
one of the five reasons listed in the statute, he is eligible for a grant of
asylum."'"
At the same time, however, the BIA made clear that in the asylum
setting a showing of past persecution merely triggers a presumption of a
well-founded fear of persecution. Although past persecution and fear of
future persecution form independent grounds for refugee status, the well-
founded fear remains the core element of the asylum standard. The Board
traced the broad outlines of a burden-shifting mechanism under which an
asylum applicant may meet her initial burden simply by proving past
persecution. Upon this showing, the burden transfers to the INS to prove
"little likelihood" of future persecution.62 Should the INS fail to meet its
burden, the applicant will be eligible for a favorable exercise of discretion
by the Attorney General. If the INS meets its burden, then the Attorney
General is entitled to deny asylum in an exercise of discretion. The proof
of little likelihood of future persecution does not, however, prohibit a grant
of asylum. If the applicant has endured particularly severe persecution or
is unable to repatriate successfully, she may be granted asylum on
humanitarian principles.63 In Chen, the BIA took administrative notice of
the changed country conditions in China to conclude that, with the
accession of Deng Xiaoping to power and the end of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the political landscape of China had changed enough that the applicant
would not encounter a comparable threat of religion-based persecution if
returned. However, the BIA granted Chen asylum on humanitarian grounds,
noting both the lifelong effects of his injuries and the fact that he lacked
enduring family ties in China.' In deciding to grant asylum on a humanitar-
61 Id. at 18.
621d. at 17-18, 20-21.
631d. at 19.
6 Id. at 19-21. The "humanitarian grant" of asylum, available to applicants who
are not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of present persecution, is
derived from the Convention: "[A] refugee... who is able to invoke compelling
reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the
protection of the country of nationality.. ." does not cease to be a refugee despite
fundamental changes in circumstances removing the basis of her fear. See
Convention, supra note 14, at Art. 1 (c)(5). After Chen, this humanitarian grant was
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ian basis, the Board made an ad hoc decision; it did not set forth the weight
to be accorded the severity of the past persecution or the personal and
logistical problems associated with repatriation.
Chen's analysis was muddy in another important respect: it did not
elucidate the burden-shifting mechanism it announced in past persecution
cases. For example, after indicating that Chen had proven past persecution,
but that changed country conditions had undercut the political situation
giving rise to his fear, the Board remarked that "the respondent has not met
his burden of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution."65 The BIA
effectively applied a double standard to Chen, requiring that he prove both
past persecution and a fear of future persecution in order to establish his
eligibility for a discretionary grant of asylum. Moreover, the Board
provided relatively little guidance on the scope of the INS's burden of
rebuttal, noting merely that the Service must show "little likelihood" of
future persecution. It confused the matter further by listing improved
political conditions in the country of origin as the only example of a factor
enabling the INS to fulfill its rebuttal burden.66
The ensuing debate over the scope of the past persecution ground may
be traced largely to opposing interpretations of the scope of the INS's
burden of rebuttal under Chen. Should readings of the case be limited to its
facts, permitting only significant changes in political conditions in the
country of origin to rebut the presumption in favor of the applicant in past
persecution cases? Conversely, should instead any development diminish-
ing the likelihood of future persecution-including personal circum-
stances-suffice to fulfill the Service's burden? Similarly, does a regime
change ousting the applicant's former persecutor presumptively show little
likelihood of future persecution, or may the applicant demonstrate that she
fears persecution from a new government or other group on the basis of the
same protected grounds? Chen did not touch on the issues of personal
circumstances or regime change; while the BIA noted the advent of a more
moderate ruler, Deng Xiaoping, it based its finding of changed circum-
codified in 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (1998).
65 In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 21.
66Some commentators have construed Chen as providing that any proof of little
likelihood of future persecution suffices to meet the INS burden. See Timothy
Mcllmail, Toward a More Reasonably Rebutted Presumption: A Proposal to
Amend the Past Persecution Asylum Regulation, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 265, 272
(1998). But see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2000), which "applied" Chen more
narrowly, requiring a change of conditions in the country of origin, or proof that
the applicant can avoid future persecution by moving to another part of the
applicant's country.
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stances more broadly on general improvements in China's human rights
situation after the Cultural Revolution.67 The BIA in Chen readily admitted
that it did not reach many of the thorniest aspects of the past persecution
presumption. Responding to the INS's argument that the BIA's stance on
past persecution would lead to "endless litigation" and "frivolous claims,"
the Board merely stated, "[W]e believe that past persecution can form the
basis for an asylum claim under the statute. When such claims are made, we
believe that they can best be handled on a case-by-case basis."68
D. Asylum Regulation of 1990
The asylum regulation promulgated by the Department of Justice in
1990 responded to Chen by clarifying the respective burdens of the
applicant and the Service in past persecution cases. The regulation was now
compliant with the United States' obligations under the Refugee Protocol.
It also set forth the criteria governing the humanitarian grant for applicants
who failed to meet the past persecution criteria for asylum. The regulation
stated that a person who makes a showing of past persecution is presumed
to have a well-founded fear of future persecution unless "a preponderance
of the evidence establishes that since the time the persecution occurred
conditions in the applicant's country of nationality ... have changed to
such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted if he [or she] were to return."69 The regulation clearly resolved
one of the problematic points addressed above-the role of personal
circumstances in determining whether the INS has met its burden of
proving little likelihood of future persecution---by stating that the INS may
invoke only changed country conditions to carry its burden. This narrowing
of the available rebuttal evidence to country conditions is consonant with
international law; the Handbookprovides that only political changes suffice
to remove the basis of persecution under the Convention.70
The regulation did not expressly address the second aspect of the
burden of INS rebuttal considered in this Note: the problem, arising most
often in cases of regime change, of whether the INS may merely demon-
strate that the applicant no longer may reasonably fear persecution by the
same agent; or whether the Service must show that the applicant no longer
fears persecution from any source. However, until the 1998 case In re
67 See In re Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 21.
61 Id. at 21-22.
69 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1990).
70 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 135.
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N--M-A-, the Board appeared to apply an expressio unis analysis: it
construed the regulation to provide that even if the applicant feared
persecution from a new regime the Service could not prove rebuttal, so long
as the applicant had an ongoing fear of persecution from any source on one
of the five protected grounds.
Finally, the 1990 asylum regulation added flesh to the bones of the
humanitarian grant set forth in Chen. Past persecution applicants who are
ineligible for a discretionary grant because the adjudicator found no
continuing fear of persecution may receive a humanitarian grant if "it is
determined that the applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for
being unwilling to return to his [or her] country of nationality... arising
out of the severity of the past persecution."'" This provision echoes the
language of the Convention, which provided a humanitarian grant for those
whose refugee status was negated by the Cessation Clauses, in an almost
identically-worded passage.72 One major difference, however, rendered the
humanitarian grant under the 1990 regulation narrower than the Conven-
tion: the Convention did not require that the applicant's reason to refuse
return be linked to the severity of the past persecution.
E. Revised Asylum Regulation of 2000
Although the 1990 regulation both codified Chen and elaborated on it
to ensure substantial compliance with the 1980 Act and the Convention,
confusion lingered: when could refugees under the Act be denied asylum
in the exercise of discretion? This continuing uncertainty did not result
from faulty drafting of the regulations, but instead from dramatic shifts in
both American politics and worldwide population movements during the
1990s, which caused Department of Justice policymakers to rethink some
aspects of the regulation.73 The influx of two new groups of asylum-
seekers-those fleeing governments in transition from Communism to
democracy and those victimized by unrepeatable harms--will be addressed
in Parts I and IV below. Just as importantly, on the national level, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
71 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1990).
72 See Convention, supra note 14, at Art. I(c)(6).
73 Between 1988 and 1995, the annual number of asylum applications in the
United States rose from 88,100 to 224,000. See European Migration Centre,
Annual Number of Asylum Applications Submitted in Selected Countries (1988
to 1997), at http://www.emz-berlin.de/Statistik/weflu006.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2003).
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("IIRIRA") imposed additional statutory bars on asylum for some
applicants considered to be national security threats. IRIRA also instituted
an "expedited removal" scheme permitting asylum officers to screen aliens
arriving in the country illegally through "credible fear" interviews before
making a non-reviewable decision whether to remove the individuals or
permit them to apply for asylum.74 This combination of external migration
pressures and internal political shifts toward restricting immigration may
have contributed to the Department of Justice's decision to modify its
asylum regulation in 1998, ensuring that it did not permit a wider realm of
asylum eligibility than mandated by treaties or domestic statutory law.75
The 1998 proposed rule suggested several significant changes to the
regulation. First, for the protection of asylum applicants, the proposed rule
elaborated the evidentiary burdens in past persecution cases: once the
applicant makes a showing of past persecution, the burden shifts to the
Service to demonstrate that no well-founded fear currently exists.76 Second,
the rule changed the wording of the INS rebuttal provision to set a higher
substantive standard for the Service's showing: it must demonstrate "no
reasonable possibility" of future persecution, rather than "little likelihood,"
as stated in the 1990 regulation.77 Third, the proposed rule expanded the
availability of humanitarian grants of asylum to those refugees unsuccessful
under the past persecution provision. The proposed regulation featured a
humanitarian grant both in cases of severe persecution and in cases in
" See generally MUSALO ET AL., supra note 6, at 129. See also Michael D.
Patrick, The New Consequences of 'Unlawful Presence, '09/22/97 N.Y.L.J 3 (col.
1).
'5 See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,945, 31,946 (June 11, 1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
208) (stating that the goal of the proposed past persecution regulation is to ensure
that the past persecution presumption works to the advantage only of those
applicants who continue to fear persecution).
1
6 Id. at 31,949 ("In cases where an applicant has demonstrated past persecution
under paragraph (b)(1) of this section before an immigration judge, the Service
shall bear the burden of establishing the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A)
or (B) of this section."). The final regulation was amended to state that the INS
bears this burden in all cases, including those before an asylum officer rather than
an IJ. See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,127 (Dec. 6, 2000)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
" See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,946 (noting that the new language conforms to the
Supreme Court's well-founded fear standard inINSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987)).
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which "the applicant has established that there is a reasonable possibility
that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal..."78 This latter
provision would permit the immigration adjudicator to consider a wide
variety of factors, such as age, family ties, and the presence of civil unrest
in the country of origin, in determining whether the applicant would face
serious harm if forced to return.79
The first three changes listed inured to the benefit of applicants. Two
other changes, arguably more momentous, restricted the scope of the
Service's rebuttal burden, thereby decreasing the range of past persecution
applicants eligible for asylum on non-humanitarian grounds. First, the
proposed regulation implemented an "internal flight alternative" provision.
While "well-founded fear" applicants bear the burden of establishing that
they may not reasonably relocate to an area of the home country where they
would not face persecution, past persecution applicants do not bear this
burden."0 However, the INS may rebut these applicants' eligibility by
demonstrating that the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating.8'
781 d. at 31,949.
791 Id. at 31,947. This broader humanitarian ground improves on the correspond-
ing 1990 provision in two respects. First, this scope conforms more closely to the
Convention, which does not require that applicants show "severe" persecution in
order to be eligible for a humanitarian grant. (Notably, however, the HANDBOOK
does not define the humanitarian grant so expansively; it provides that this grant
should issue only in the "special case where a person may have been subjected to
very serious persecution in the past... ." UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17,
136.) Second, it adheres more to the logic of Chen; in that case, the decision to
grant the applicant asylum on humanitarian grounds was based on both the severity
of his prior mistreatment, his health, and his inability to reacclimate to life in
China. See In re Chen, 20 1. &N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989); see also In re H-, 211. &
N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1996). This broadened ground is especially significant in light
of the fact that appeals courts have given a very narrow construction to the "severe
persecution" provision in the humanitarian grant, suggesting that only persecution
rising to the level of the Holocaust in its inhumanity would render the individual
eligible for the grant. See generally Boed, supra note 14, at 174 n.227.
SO See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2002).
"' See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,949. This Note does not assess the impact of the
internal flight alternative ("IFA") provision, but it arguably plays a dramatic role
in limiting the availability of the past persecution presumption. The new promi-
nence of the IFA in the U.S. asylum regulation may be inspired in part by Canadian
refugee law, which provides that the claimant is not a refugee unless the adjudica-
tor is satisfied that no internal relocation possibility exists. See generally MUSALO
ET AL., supra note 6, at 209. Both the new U.S. regulation and Canadian law place
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Secondly, and most critically for the present analysis, the proposed rule
stipulated that an IJ may find the past persecution presumption rebutted if
"the applicant does not face a reasonable possibility of future persecu-
tion.... ,82 Omitting the requirement of changed country conditions, the
rule would allow the Service to draw evidence from any source to show
that an applicant's fear is extinguished---even if the evidence relates to the
applicant's personal circumstances.83 In proposing this rule, the Department
clearly targeted unrepeatable harms, such as forced sterilization and
FGM. 4
In the notice-and-comment period following the 1998 proposed rule,
thirty-five parties responded to the suggested changes. Twenty-six of the
commenters sought wholesale abandonment of the proposed changes to the
past prosecution provision, on two main grounds: first, that the Attorney
General had acted ultra vires in limiting the grounds for asylum eligibility
available in the INA; 5 and second, that the proposed changes in evidence
admissible to rebut the claim violated customary international law, as
articulated in the Handbook.86 The other nine commenters, while not
demanding complete withdrawal of the rule, nonetheless objected to almost
more emphasis on the IFA than the Handbook, which provides that proof of
countrywide persecution is not essential to establishing a valid asylum claim. See
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 91. The Handbook does, however, provide
that a showing of a reasonable IFA option may, under some circumstances, defeat
an asylum claim. Id. UNHCR has more recently specified that IFA should be
considered only where the asylum applicant fears persecution by a private actor, the
state cannot control the actor, and effective state protection would be available in
another part of the country. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 6, at 208.
82 New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal,
63 Fed. Reg. at 31,949.
83 Id. at 31,946 -31,947.
84 d. (discussing C-Y-Z-, a forced sterilization/abortion case in which the
Board applied the rule that only country conditions may rebut a past persecution
claim, but at the same time appeared to contest the rule's logic). See infra Part IV.
Under the amended Act, forced sterilization or abortion constituting part of a
population control program is deemed to be a form ofpersecution. See Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1997).
'5 See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,126 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
86 Unlike the proposed regulation, which provided that any information indi-
cating the absence of an ongoing fear might obviate the applicant's claim, the
HANDBOOK provides that only "fundamental changes in the country" may negate
the applicant's claim. UNHCRHANDBOOK, supra note 17, 135 (emphasis added).
See infra Part IV.
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all of the proposed modifications.8 7 Given the fact that the proposed rule,
as noted above, contained provisions both expanding and restricting the
past persecution ground-both "pros" and "cons" from the perspective of
asylum advocates--this univocal rejection seems surprising. Upon parsing
the proposed rule, however, it is clear that the proposals disadvantaging
applicants--the internal flight alternative provision and the admission of
any evidence to fulfill the Service's rebuttal burden-actually expanded the
subject matter available to the INS to defeat a past persecution claim after
the applicant has met her burden. Their effect did not depend upon the
agency's construction of the regulation. The proposals benefiting appli-
cants, on the other hand, such as the additional "other serious harm"
humanitarian prong and the shift of the rebuttal showing from "little
likelihood" to "no reasonable possibility," would likely have a much more
attenuated effect, since they were contingent upon IJs' construction of the
two new standards. The burden of proof provision, ostensibly benefiting
applicants, held little punch since the doctrine of administrative notice
permits the asylum adjudicator effectively to fill the Service's burden of
proof for it through the introduction of country condition reports.88
In its final regulation, the Department of Justice rebuffed most of the
comments, leaving the proposed rule largely intact. Responding particularly
to the ultra vires contention, the Department reminded commenters that the
Attorney General has the authority to place narrower limits on asylum
eligibility than the statute places on refugee status. 89 At the same time, the
final rule implemented three changes, none of which, from the perspective
of asylum advocates, fully remedied the damaging aspects of the proposed
rule. In a nod to the language of the Handbook, the final regulation deletes
the "no reasonable possibility of future persecution" clause designating the
Service's rebuttal burden, providing instead that the burden is met where
"[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the
applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution."90 This
language partially echoes the Handbook's requirement that only a
"fundamental change in the country" may negate the prospective refugee's
87 See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,126.
88 See infra Part V.
89 See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,121, 76,126 (noting, in response
to comments that the new regulations were ultra vires, that the INA permits the
Attorney General to impose asylum criteria supplementing those set forth in the
statute).
90 Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (2000).
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fear of persecution, but it omits the Handbook's requirement that the
change pertain only to circumstances in the applicant's country of origin.9
The final regulation also clarifies that the burden-shifting scheme applies
to adjudications by asylum officers, as well as Js. Finally, and perhaps of
most concern to asylum advocates, the regulation, in its statement of
purpose, incorporates the BIA's opinion in In re N--M-A-, which held
that the INS's rebuttal burden in past persecution cases is limited to
disproving a continuing threat emanating from the application's previous
persecutor.92
III. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE INS BURDEN:
IN RE N-M-A-
Like the post-World War II era that spawned the international law
framework for refugee status, the 1990s witnessed both widespread regime
change and rapid shifts in political ideologies and methods of government.
These trends were especially pronounced in Eastern Europe, where nascent
democracies struggled with no preexisting infrastructures for representative
government and only weak systems for providing social services. These
chaotic circumstances tested the mettle of a refugee regime founded on an
individualized inquiry into the asylum-seeker's basis for fearing persecu-
tion; such an inquiry would involve investigating country conditions in
constant flux and the developing policies of new regimes toward religious,
political, ethnic and social groups. Arguably in response to these chal-
lenges, the Department of Justice instituted a "same source" rule, first
articulated in In re N-M-A-. 93 This rule provided that the INS may meet
its burden of rebuttal in past persecution cases by demonstrating that the
applicant's previous persecutor no longer poses a threat; thus, it impeded
asylum eligibility for some applicants fleeing turbulent political conditions
in the former Soviet bloc. Pragmatic foreign policy considerations may
have dictated this partial abdication of international law refugee designa-
tion principles. As the Galina case demonstrated, the United States often
supported fledgling post-Soviet regimes accused by asylum-seekers of
continuing their predecessors' legacies of mistreating minorities.94 As one
scholar notes, in the post-Soviet era, "[1]ittle gain could be gleaned from the
9' UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 135.
92 See In re N-M-A-, 22 1. &N. Dec. 312 (BIA 1998).
93 id.
94 See supra Part I.
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'trophy refugee,' the living symbol of the rival ideology's failures." 9 This
Part argues that the "same source" rule exceeds the statutory authority set
forth by the INA; the rule also flies in the face of both the individualized
test for refugee status in the Convention and the post-World War H
rationale for the past persecution ground as an aid to refugees fleeing
chaotic country conditions.
A. The Broad Nexus Set Forth in Chen and the Handbook: Unchanged
Basis of Fear
Under In re Chen, as codified and altered in the 1990 asylum regula-
tion, an applicant's showing of past persecution served alone to meet the
applicant's burden of proof. While "well-founded fear" cases involve both
objective and subjective components-separate analyses of the credibility
and the sincerity of the applicant's fear-the applicant's burden in a past
persecution case may be met by a purely objective showing of past events.96
Under Chen, an applicant could be denied asylum in the exercise of
discretion after meeting this burden of proof if the Service demonstrates
that "there is little likelihood of present persecution."97 The standard
announced in Chen does not indicate that past persecution triggers a
presumption only of similar or identical persecution in the future.
Moreover, the Convention and the Handbook, extensively cited in both
Chen and the statement of purpose to the 2000 asylum regulation, support
the view that the presumption is limited only by the basis of the applicant's
fear, an internal standard-not the identity of the persecutor, an external
one. Under the Convention's Cessation Clauses, refugee status ends when
the individual "can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue
to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality."98 In glossing this provision, the Handbooknotes that "'circum-
stances' refer to fundamental changes in the country, which can be assumed
95 Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary "Refuge"
and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 33 VA. J. INT'L. L. 13, 28 (1994).
96 See In re Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (BIA 1989).
9' Id at 18. The corresponding standard in the current regulation reads as
follows: "[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the
applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant's
country of nationality ..." Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal,
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (2000).
98 Convention, supra note 14, at Article 1(C)(5).
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to remove the basis of the fear of persecution."9 This emphasis on the
fear's basis reinforces the ultimate reference point in modem refugee
determinations: "the general concept of 'fear' for a relevant motive."' By
this reasoning, a political shift may not be deemed to eliminate the basis of
an applicant's fear of persecution, absent an individualized inquiry into the
new regime's motive-its attitude toward the characteristics that originally
made the applicant a target for persecution. The facts of the N-M-A case,
in which the applicant feared persecution at the hands of both secular and
Islamist regimes, dramatically show that persecutors with opposite
ideologies may target the same groups for mistreatment. 10 1
A plain-language reading of Chen and the Handbook's gloss of the
Cessation Clauses indicates that, in the burden-shifting scheme advanced
in Chen, the INS must demonstrate that the applicant no longer has any
present fear of persecution based on the same protected ground that formed
the basis of the past persecution, without respect to the form or source of
the threat.
B. The "Same Source" Requirement of In re N-M-A-
A 1998 BIA case, In re N-M-A-, significantly alters the burden-
shifting mechanism announced in Chen in two respects. First, the holding
limits the Service's burden of proof by imposing a requirement that the
agents of the past persecution and of the feared future persecution be
identical. 0 2 Second, it injects a procedural wrinkle in the form of a reverse
burden shift. If the Service demonstrates that the applicant does not fear
persecution from the same source, "the applicant bears the burden of
demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear of persecution from any new
source."" '3 Effectively, this provision returns to square one any asylum
applicant who fears mistreatment at the hands of a different persecutor; she
must prove both the subjective and objective elements of her present well-
99 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 135 (emphasis added). On a general
level, the clauses establish that, in order for a past experience of persecution to
continue to support refugee status, the basis of the refugee's fear of persecution
must remain unchanged--not that the means by which that fear might be brought
to fruition be identical.
100 Id. 37.
"o In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312 (BIA 1998).
I2 id.
'03 Id. at 316.
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founded fear. '04 Making this showing is particularly difficult when dramatic
political change followed the applicant's flight.' Thus, the holding
restricts the availability of past persecution as a truly independent asylum
eligibility ground to those cases in which the applicant's original persecutor
continues to pose a significant threat.
The applicant in N-M--A-, an Afghan mujahidin sympathizer, was
persecuted by the communist government in 1989 because of his and his
father's affiliations with a mujahidin faction." 6 In 1995, the IJ denied the
applicant's claim based on administrative notice of changed country
conditions. The mujahidin-sympathetic Jamiat faction, under Bernahuddin
Rabbani, toppled the communist regime in 1992.07 At the asylum hearing
the IJ noted that the applicant still faced a risk of harm due to Rabbani's
tenuous grip on power, but he stated that the applicant's fear resulted more
from the chaos and remnants of civil war in the country than from a well-
founded fear of persecution.' On appeal to the BIA, the applicant
submitted evidence that since the original adjudication of his claim, the
Taliban-not sympathetic to the mujahidin-had taken over almost three-
fourths of Afghanistan.0 9 Just as he had faced a threat from the communist
government because his religious views conflicted with that regime's
secularism, he now feared persecution by the Taliban because its extreme
religious orientation conflicted with his more moderate beliefs and his
support for democracy."'
Although the applicant's past persecution and his fear of future
persecution arose from the same basis--government disapproval of his
religious and political affiliations-the BIA found that the Service had met
'04 My thanks to Mark von Steinberg, Senior Attorney, Refugee Services,
Catholic Charities Archdiocese of New York, for this characterization of the
N-M-A- burden shift.
'o' See infra Part III.D.
106 The applicant was persecuted by the communist supported government in
1989 when the communist secret police discovered that his father had supplied
clothing and medical supplies to the faction. The secret police abducted his father;
the applicant never saw his father again. After the kidnapping, the applicant agreed
to circulate fliers for the same faction his father had supported. The communist
secret police again raided his home, found one of the fliers, and detained the
applicant for one month. During this period the applicant was hit, kicked, and
deprived of food for three days. See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 314.
1071d.
1
08 id.
109 Id.
"0 Id. at 316.
[VOL. 91
AN ENDURING FEAR
its burden of proving that the applicant no longer faced a well-founded
fear."' Extending both the holding of Chen and the plain language of the
1990 regulation in an unforeseen manner, the Board construed them to
require a nexus not just between the protected characteristics motivating
past and feared future persecution, but also between the perpetrator of past
persecution and the agent of the current threat.112
The majority construed the past persecution presumption as "an
evidentiary presumption founded on the probability of a past event being
indicative of a future event.""' 3 It viewed reasonable foreseeability as the
rationale behind the presumption: "Because it is foreseeable that a
persecutor would continue to be interested in one of his victims of
persecution, the regulation removes the burden from the applicant to show
that he may suffer persecution again at the hands of his past persecutor. '' '
This interpretation, the majority stated, supports the accurate view of
asylum as "a prophylactic protection for those who might face future
persecution," not as a "remedy [for] the past."' 15 This reading views the
presumption as merely evidentiary and conducive to administrative
efficiency; a showing of past persecution serves as a convenient proxy for
proof ofa present well-founded fear. 6 Allowing past persecution from one
source to stand in for proof of feared harm from a different source would,
under this reasoning, grant the applicant a windfall. Second, the majority
cited the Cessation Clauses of the U.N. Convention to argue that, in order
for the underlying circumstances of the past persecution to remain in
existence, the applicant's present well-founded fear must emanate from the
original persecutor.' The majority stated that its holding "does not stand
for the proposition that any change in a regime automatically reverts the
burden of proof back to the applicant to show that he has a well-founded
fear of persecution from the changed regime or its successor.""' 8 The
holding does, however, effectively limit the past persecution presumption
in regime-change situations to two scenarios: either the original persecutor
retains enough political control to pose an ongoing threat, although it does
not lead the country; or the group that has risen to power in the previous
"'Id. at 317.
l12Id
113 id.
114Id.
"' Id. at 316.
116 id.
117 Id. at 318.
" 8 Id. at 320.
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persecutor's place does not have effective control over the previous
persecutor."19
The dissenters in the case, on the other hand, read the past persecution
presumption in American asylum law as a "humanitarian," rather than an
"evidentiary," standard. 2° In a vigorous dissent, Board Member Lory
Rosenberg contended that the majority borrowed selectively from the
Convention in order to bolster a position which had no foundation in
international law.' 2 ' Rosenberg also argued that the majority acted ultra
vires in extending the meaning of the regulation.'22 Rosenberg commented,
"By interjecting into our application of the existing regulation-and our
precedent-new and narrowing concepts that require evidence of the
continuation of a 'particular threat' from an 'original persecutor' as
opposed to a 'new source,' the majority has acted to restrict access to
asylum based on past persecution to refugees in whose countries 'condi-
tions' have been absolutely static."'
23
Some commentators, agreeing with the dissent, have noted that the
N-M-A- holding threatens to "swallow" the past persecution ground
entirely by dramatically diminishing the INS's rebuttal burden.'24
C. In re N-M-A- Unlawfully Extends the Regulation and Violates
International Law Principles
When assessed with an eye to the text of the asylum regulation (in its
1990 and 2000 forms), the enabling act, and the international refugee
instruments, N-M-A- appears both to lack textual support and to
undercut basic purposes of the past persecution ground. N-M-A-
putatively only narrows the scope of the INS's burden of rebuttal in past
persecution cases. In reality, however, it significantly alters the asylum
adjudication, permitting the INS to satisfy its burden in cases of regime
119Id.
'20 Id. at 327 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
122 id.
123 Id. at 330. This Note does not touch on the "same type" criterion implied in
the opinion-4he requirement that the applicant fear the same sort of persecution
in the future as well as persecution from the same source.
124 See Eleanor Acer & Beth Lyon, And the Boat Is Still Rocking: Asylum
Practice Update in the Midst of Shifting Regulations and Caselaw: Part Two, 99-
03 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (Mar. 1999).
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change through generalized facts, without an individualized inquiry into the
applicant's basis for fearing persecution.
First, as noted above, the Convention demands that the adjudicator
assess the prospective refugee's subjective fear of persecution and the
objective circumstances that gave rise to it.125 A fundamental change in
circumstances removing the basis of the applicant's'fear may not be a
purely external factor, such as a de jure regime change; the change must
relate to the applicant's protected characteristic or affiliation. Hannah
Arendt's case study of modem dictatorships, The Origins of Totalitarian-
ism, makes clear that no matter what their political orientation, these
regimes share the tendency to create pariahs.126 Particularly if precedents
of unequal treatment are deeply ingrained, assuming regime change to
eradicate the "basis" of the applicant's fear is a tenuous claim.'27 Moreover,
given that regime change often merely places the reins of human rights
abuse in new hands-not changing the fundamental values and practices of
a government--the Handbook's "fundamental change" requirement is at
cross-purposes with the "same source" rule of N M-A-.
121
Second, the holding arguably exceeds the scope of the agency's
delegated authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The INA
provides that the Attorney General "may provide by regulation for any
other conditions or limitations on the consideration of an application for
asylum not inconsistent with this Act." The Department of Justice cited this
grant in its statement of purpose accompanying the 2000 regulation.'29 The
Act provides that past persecution may serve as an independent basis of
125 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 37.
126 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM xxxiii (1973).
127 As Board member Rosenberg noted in dissent, characterizing the govem-
ment alone as the "basis" for the applicant's fear, without assessing its relationship
to his opinions, mischaracterizes the subjective element of well-founded fear
standard. See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 332.
128 The Department of Justice implicitly acknowledged the tension between the
new "fundamental change" provision and the "same source" rule in its preamble
to the amended 2000 regulations. There, drafters of the regulation stated that the
fundamental change requirement "is not intended to alter the holding in ...
N-M-A-." Asylum Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,127 (Dec. 6, 2000) (to
be codified in 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). See In re N-M-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 325. Cf
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 17, 136 ("Even though there may have been a
change of regime .... this may not always produce a complete change of mind in
the attitude of the population .... ).
129 See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,126 (Dec. 6, 2000)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
refugee status so long as it renders the individual "unwilling or unable" to
return to the country of origin. 13 ° A "same source" requirement is not
consistent with this standard; as noted above, regime change does not
routinely coincide with improvement in human rights practices. The "same
source" rule injects into the asylum determination a rule unrelated to the
validity of the ongoing fear of return, and is therefore counter to the
purposes of the INA's asylum provisions.
Defenders of both N--M-A- and the 2000 regulation argue that to
decry them as exceeding the scope of the statute is to confuse statutory
refugee status with entitlement to a positive exercise of discretion.13"' This
formalistic argument overlooks the fact that such a discrepancy between
statutory refugee status and eligibility under the regulation creates a no-
man's-land in which individuals entitled by the international instruments
to seek refuge from persecution may no longer invoke the past persecution
ground for asylum. The legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act sheds
light on the extent of the discretion that the Act conferred when permitting
the Attorney General to impose additional restrictions on asylum criteria.
The Senate report stating the purpose and background of the Act cites with
support a letter from Senator Ted Kennedy to Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance, in which Kennedy spoke of the "urgent need for the United States
to begin to take the steps necessary to establish a long range refugee
policy-a policy which will treat all refugees fairly and assist all refugees
equally."' Imposing limits on the asylum adjudication unrelated to the
statutory standard (whether past persecution has rendered the applicant
unwilling and unable to return) would appear to contravene this goal.
Moreover, addressing asylum provisions, the report repeatedly states that
the U.N. Protocol should govern the substantive standard for asylum. 33 As
noted above, a change in the identity of potential persecutors does not
always mean that the circumstances surrounding the applicant's persecution
have ceased to exist, as required by the Convention and Protocol. The
Senate report indicates that the N-M-A- holding, as incorporated into
130 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1997).
'3' See generally Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,127 (stating concisely
of purpose behind 2000 regulation changes); see also Mcllmail, supra note 66
(arguing that limitations on the Attorney General's exercise of discretion do not
render asylum regulations ultra vires, so long as the statutory refugee definition
remains consonant with the international instruments).
132 S. REP. 96-256, at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 142
(emphasis added).
" See id. at 8.
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the regulation, narrows the scope of the past persecution-based asylum
grant to an extent unforeseen by the statute.
Finally, the N-M-A- holding exceeds the scope of the 1990 asylum
regulation, as noted by Board Member Rosenberg.'34 It extends the
regulation, even in its 2000 version, in a manner endangering applicants'
procedural due process rights. According to the text of both the 1990 and
2000 versions, only a showing that the applicant no longer has a well-
founded fear of persecution fulfills the Service's rebuttal burden.'35 As
noted above, showing that a specific past persecutor no longer poses a
threat does not disprove an ongoing fear of persecution. Some federal
circuits have held that, in order to observe the asylum applicant's proce-
dural due process rights under the regulation, the asylum adjudicator must
conduct an individualized analysis to determine how country changes
impact the applicant's fear of persecution.'36 As Board Member Rosenberg
argued in dissent, a holding that effectively limits the Service's rebuttal
burden on the basis of an external political factor such as regime change,
without an inquiry into its effects on the applicant, denies that applicant the
right to an individualized adjudication.'37 The restriction dramatically
reduces the scope of the the presumption to which the applicant is entitled
and does not represent a reasonable inference from the text of either the
1990 or the 2000 regulation, even though the statement of purpose
accompanying the 2000 regulation expresses the Department of Justice's
intent to retain the holding. The N-M-A- rule also effects a significant
procedural change unanticipated by the language of the regulation by
reverting the burden of proof to the applicant even in a situation where the
BIA has not found the applicant's fear of persecution alleviated.
D. The In re N-M-A- Rule Gives Rise to Cursory Conclusions that a
Source of Past Persecution No Longer Exists
Even for those applicants who do fear future harm from the agent of
past persecution, the N-M-A- rule risks inaccurate denials of asylum.
The dissenters' position in the case realistically acknowledges the difficulty
114 See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. &. N. Dec. at 330.
135 See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i) (1990); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (2002).
136 See generally Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that the BIA may accept only individualized facts, rather than legislative facts
concerning regime change, to find that the NS has met its burden of rebuttal).
"' See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 331.
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of ascertaining the source of an asylum applicant's fear of persecution. The
N-M-A- holding may permit improper denials for two categories of
applicants: those who, because their group is equally mistreated by the
former and current regimes, continue to have a well-founded fear in spite
of regime change; 3 ' and those who continue to be threatened by a political
faction that, while no longer in power, still wields considerable control over
the applicant. The toppled faction may maintain power through the
popularity of its party in certain areas of the country, through paramilitary
organizations, or through the police force.'39 As Hannah Arendt notes in
The Origins of Totalitarianism, repressive regimes operate chiefly by
subterfuge and the bifurcation of formal and informal authority. 40 In this
confusing environment, a faction nominally ousted may continue to pose
a grave threat to citizens.
One commentator contrasts "formalist" and "dynamic" views of
political power in the asylum assessment: formalists are more likely to view
a report announcing the accession of a new leader to power as evidence that
the perpetrator of past harms no longer has the power to persecute the
applicant.'4 ' The N-M-A- holding, while stating that it does not
automatically conflate a dejure regime change with the eradication of the
applicant's fear of persecution from the previous regime,'42 risks permit-
ting Js, whose area of expertise is immigration law rather than geo-
138 In concept, these applicants are placed in the same position as any other
"well-founded fear" applicants; they simply do not enjoy the presumption afforded
by a finding of past persecution. In practice, however, once such applicants are
forced to begin at square one, the proof of their case may be more difficult since
they may no longer rely on a nexus between past mistreatment and present fears of
persecution.
139 While persecution is normally inflicted by the ruling government, it may also
"emanate from sections of the population that do not respect the standards
established by the laws of the country concemed"-groups over which the ruling
regime does not exercise effective control. JNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17,
65.
40 See ARENDT, supra note 126, at 474-76.
4 1 See Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future ofAsylum Law,
71 U. COLO. L. REv. 3, 39-40 (2000) (arguing that the use of administrative notice
to give outcome-determinative weight to human rights reports conflicts with the
asylum-seeker's right to an individualized adjudication; the trend toward wholesale
acceptance of such reports as indicators of a faction's ability to persecute
constitutes a rise in "formalist" thinking).
141 In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312 at 317.
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politics,'43 to give disproportionate weight to superficial reports of country
conditions in assessing whether the INS has met its burden of rebuttal. As
Part IV below demonstrates, IJs and the BIA frequently take administrative
notice of U.S. State Department or nonprofit organization human rights
reports, or accept reports submitted by the INS as evidence of the appli-
cant's lessened objective basis for fearing persecution. Evidence of regime
change forms an enticingly simple alternative to assessing the complex
power dynamics that result from the toppling of a repressive regime. The
First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have blazed new paths in requiring that
the BIA not accept generalized statements in human rights reports as
wholesale evidence that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution.1" Nonetheless, the N-M-A- holding may yield an
environment in which adjudicators rely on the "same source" requirement
and then give excessive credence to general reports of regime change or
human rights improvements. Because of the interrelationship of persecutors
and the incapacity of even the best-informed IJs fully to assess the link
between regime change and human rights improvements around the world,
the N-M-A- holding prevents applicants from enjoying the past
persecution presumption even when there is a significant factual nexus
between past persecution and feared future persecution.
Notably, applicants ineligible for a past persecution grant due to
N-M-A-- have other available avenues to asylum. Even if their past
persecution is not deemed "severe" by the IJ, they may seek a humanitarian
grant under the "other serious harm" category. 45 In its proposal to add the
"other serious harm" provision to the regulation, the Department of Justice
cited Matter ofB-, a case in which the applicant was granted asylum on
143 See Tome, supra note 10, at 437-38 (arguing that IJs in some circumstances
lack the resources to make informed deductions about country conditions).
4 4 See infra Part V. See generally Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir.
1998) (holding that the BIA may accept only individualized facts, rather than
legislative facts concerning regime change, to find that the INS has met its burden
of rebuttal); see also Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955,958-59 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that because State Department reports tend to "look on the bright side" when
assessing human rights conditions in a country with which the United States has
friendly relations, general statements in U.S. State Department reports noting
human rights improvements may not alone fulfill the INS's burden of rebuttal); see
also Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
where the BIA takes administrative notice of regime change, the asylum applicant
must be provided with the opportunity to rebut the noticed facts).
1'5 Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B) (2002).
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humanitarian grounds due partly to the severity of his past persecution and
partly to the chaotic atmosphere of civil war that would greet him were he
returned to Afghanistan. 46 This may indicate that the Department
considered this new humanitarian ground to be a gap-filler in regime
change cases where, although the Service may demonstrate that the
previous persecutor no longer has the capacity to harm, deportation would
likely subject the applicant to mistreatment on the basis of a protected
ground. In these cases, as well, the applicant might otherwise meet
insurmountable barriers as a "well-founded fear" applicant, since tumultu-
ous country conditions impede her from supplying proof that the new
regime will single her out for persecution. Because humanitarian grants of
asylum are considered under a "totality of the circumstances" test, however,
with the factors balanced resting largely in the discretion of the agency, the
"other serious harm" provision may not remedy the injustice worked by the
N-M-A- rule. N-M-A- deprives past persecution refugees of an
evidentiary presumption to which they are entitled under the text of the
regulation, and it subverts the Convention's refugee designation principles
by conditioning relief upon purely external political factors.
IV. NON-REPEATABLE HARMS AND THE
"FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE" PROVISION OF THE 2000 REGULATIONS:
EXPANDING THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE INS TO REBUT
THE PAST PERSECUTION PRESUMPTION
In the early 1990s, even as Congress prepared to tighten immigration
controls, a movement developed to offer asylum to aliens who fled their
countries because they had suffered or were threatened with inhumane
procedures impairing their reproductive or sexual functions, such as forced
abortion and sterilization and FGM.'47 In the landmark case In re Kasinga,
the BIA found FGM to be a form of persecution. 4 In the wake of an
' See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,945, 31,947 (June 11, 1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
208) (citing Matter of B-, I. & N. Dec. 3251 (BIA 1995)).
147 See Illegal Immigrant Responsibility and Immigration Reform Act (IIRIRA)
§ 601(a)(1), amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §
1 101 (a)(42) (1997). Congress enacted this provision in response to the BIA's hold-
ing inln re Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989), in which the BIA denied asylum
to an applicant who was threatened with coercive population control programs; on
female genital mutilation, see Illegal Immigrant Responsibility and Immigration
Reform Act § 645, 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2003), criminalizing the practice of FGM.
"' In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996).
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IIRIRA amendment to the INA defining forced abortion or sterilization of
a person or his/her spouse as persecution when it is inflicted as part of a
coercive population control program,149 the immigration courts received an
avalanche of asylum claims from victims of these abuses, and from
applicants who feared that they or .their spouses would fall victim to
population control measures in the future. 5° In the case of victims of FGM
or forced sterilization, immigration courts were faced with the daunting
task of reconciling unrepeatable personal harms with the clause of the
regulation providing that only changes in country conditions may fulfill the
INS's rebuttal burden in past persecution cases. 5'
One commentator characterizes unrepeatable harms to the person under
the 1990 regulation as an "irrebuttable presumption" of future harm.'52
Even if the persecutors continue such practices, the applicants cannot
possibly fear similar harm in the future, since the first occurrence irrevoca-
bly damaged their bodies. As that author bluntly describes FGM, "Such an
excision, or even a sunna-type procedure, if done 'correctly,' cannot be
performed again; they are practices to be feared once."'5 3 The result, he
argues, is "a particularly unsatisfying mechanical application divorced from
reality"--a presumption without meaning.'54 This argument begs the
question, raised in the N-M-A- case, of the required similarity of past
and feared future persecution. For example, while an applicant may not
suffer FGM twice, she may, through her objection to FGM, define herself
as part of the social group of FGM victims targeted for government
mistreatment because they speak out against the practice.'55 She would fear
a different type of persecution, but one grounded in her prior experience of
FGM. The treatment of unrepeatable harms in the asylum regulation pits
'49 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)
(1997). Forced sterilization is unrepeatable, effectively negating both the appellant's
and his/her spouse's fear of future similar treatment. Forced abortion, a repeatable
harm, does not raise the same issues.
50 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5)
(2002) (Only 1000 aliens may be granted asylum on this basis each year. However,
aliens may be granted withholding of removal on the basis of coercive family
planning programs after the asylum quota has been met. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 207(b)).
' Procedure for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i)(a) (1990).
152 See McIlmail, supra note 66, at 276.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 274.
"' See In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).
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two fundamental principles of international refugee law against each other:
the respect to be accorded victims of atrocious harms; and the view of past
persecution as a presumption of an ongoing well-founded fear, rather than
an independently sufficient ground for asylum eligibility.
A. Looking Beyond Country Conditions to Determine Whether the Risk of
Persecution Continues
In a series of cases in the mid-1990s, INS attorneys argued that the
"country condition" requirement of the 1990 asylum regulation was
phrased too narrowly to achieve the purpose of the Chen holding: ensuring
that past persecution applicants enjoyed a presumption of asylum eligibility
only as long as the INS could not prove future persecution unlikely.'56 The
INS further contended that, because applicants faced little likelihood of
similar future treatment in unrepeatable harm cases, they must demonstrate
that the forced sterilization or abortion was carried out in such a way as to
constitute an "atrocious form" of persecution.' 57 In effect, the INS sought
to limit the asylum eligibility of FGM victims to the humanitarian ground,
despite the fact that it could not demonstrate country conditions eliminating
the victims' fears, as the regulation required.'58 The BIA rejected this
rationale in In re C-Y-Z--, granting asylum on the basis of the past
persecution presumption to an applicant whose wife had suffered forced
sterilization.'59 Confronted by the seeming illogic of its quandary, the BIA
stated, "[T]he regulatory presumption of a well-founded fear of future
156 See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (June 11, 1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
157 In re C-Y-Z---, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 921 (BIA 1997) (noting that the
Service argued that the applicant be required both to prove past sterilization and to
show that the procedure was "atrocious"; the Board rejected this reasoning). The
INS argued that this heightened showing should be required in cases involving both
forced sterilization and forced abortion, seemingly overlooking the fact that forced
abortion is not an unrepeatable form of persecution.
158 See id.
"' An applicant for asylum may "stand in the shoes" of his/her spouse for the
purposes of a past persecution asylum claim involving forced sterilization or
abortion. See id. at 918. The BIA also found that, because population control
programs often sterilize only one spouse to destroy the couple's fertility, spouses
of sterilization victims may be assumed not to fear similar future treatment. Id. This
factor did not influence the outcome of C-Y-Z-, however, since the Board held
that only changed country conditions could rebut the presumption in favor of the
applicant.
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persecution may not be rebutted in the absence of changed country
conditions, regardless of the fact that the sterilization of the alien's spouse
negates the likelihood of future sterilization to the alien."16
In arguing that its rebuttal burden not be limited to country conditions,
the INS relied heavily on the vague language of Chen. As noted above, that
holding stated that the Service's duty was limited to showing "little
likelihood" of future persecution. At the same time, it listed country
conditions as the only example of evidence sufficient to support such a
showing. One commentator notes that the 1990 asylum regulation merely
"tightened up the BIA's reasoning in In re Chen with regard to the burden
on the INS."'' Viewed in this manner, the 1990 regulation constituted a
discretionary limit on the evidence available to the INS to meet its burden
of rebuttal.
On the other hand, an approach emphasizing U.S. obligations under the
U.N. Protocol seeks to define the scope of the INS rebuttal burden by the
language not of Chen, but of the Handbook, which is persuasive authority
for American courts.162 The Handbook provides that only a fundamental,
durable change in conditions in the applicant's country of origin may
remove the basis of an applicant's fear of persecution and thus deprive her
of refugee status. 6 ' A regulation permitting changes in personal circum-
stances (such as the occurrence of FGM or forced sterilization) to bar
asylum eligibility arguably restricts the benefits available to statutory
refugees in contravention of international law.
In December 2000, the Department of Justice put this debate to rest by
omitting reference to changed country conditions in the new regulation.
The regulation now provides that the INS, to rebut past persecution
applicants' presumption of asylum eligibility, must show that "[t]here has
been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no
longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant's country of
nationality.... ."'6 The Department emphasized its reliance on international
law concepts embodied in the Handbook-such as the requirement that the
change in circumstances be "fundamental"--in its concise statement of
purpose to the new regulation. However, the new clause conflicted with the
Handbook by implicitly allowing changes in personal circumstances to
160 Id. at 915.
161 McIlmail, supra note 66, at 270.
162 See supra note 16.
163 See generally Acer & Lyon, supra note 124, at 3.
'6 Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (2002).
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negate an applicant's future fear of persecution.'65 The Department noted
that the "fundamental change" language, as well as the omission of country
conditions in the standard, brought the asylum regulation into alignment
with the INA standard governing termination of asylum.
66
B. The "Fundamental Change" Provision of the 2000 Regulations
Contravenes International Law Principles and Subverts Congressional
Intent
The debate over the treatment ofunrepeatable harms in the new asylum
regulation centers on the same two questions at the heart of the "same
source" requirement of N-M-A-1 67 First, is the past persecution
presumption an evidentiary or humanitarian tool? Second, as long as the
statutory refugee definition contained in the INA complies with the
international human rights instruments to which the United States is a
party, may the Department of Justice through regulation constrain the
Attorney General's discretion to grant asylum to the extent that asylum is
a virtual impossibility for a large group of refugees who have suffered
unrepeatable harms?
The past persecution presumption was clearly designed as a complex
accommodation of persecution's lasting effects-not as a strict evidentiary
presumption. Accounts of the drafting of the IRO Constitution demonstrate
that humanitarian motives, not motives of administrative efficiency, drove
the first articulation of the past persecution ground. 68 Based on respect for
the trauma that Holocaust victims endured, this ground was intended to
acknowledge the fact that the wide-ranging negative effects of past
persecution often prevent a refugee from remaining in the country where
she suffered the harm. Some of these effects include the involuntary
replaying of traumatic experience (today classified as post-traumatic stress
symptoms) and the frequent isolation of past persecution victims from
165 See id.
166 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158
(1997).
167 See supra Part II.
168 See supra notes 31-33. Under the Constitution, "Victims of the Nazi or
fascist regimes" were defimed as refugees despite the fact that these regimes had
been removed from power when the document was drafted. See Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization, February 16, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 3.
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social and political life in their countries of origin.169 Even if these negative
experiences do not rise to the level of persecution, they do form part of an
enduring legacy of past persecution. The Handbook also acknowledges the
complex repercussions of past persecution.' 70 The logic behind the 2000
asylum regulations, on the other hand, appears to regard persecution
victims as receiving a windfall if they cannot demonstrate that they face a
substantial probability of similar treatment if returned to their countries of
origin. 7 ' This view greatly underestimates the lasting effects of persecution
and deviates from the international law principles articulated in the UN
Convention, the UN Protocol, and the Handbook.
The statement of purpose accompanying the amended 2000 asylum
regulation defends limiting the availability of the past persecution ground
to victims of unrepeatable harms on the argument that the regulation only
constrains the discretion of the Attorney General in determining whether
or not to grant asylum.'72 The statement goes on to provide that the
amended regulation does not conflict with the statutory refugee definition
contained in INA § 101 (a)(42), which continues to define past persecution
as an independent ground for refugee status.173 One commentator makes a
similar argument, noting that the amended past persecution regulations
should be viewed as a roadmap governing the criteria for asylum grants,
and not as an ultra vires limitation of the refugee definition. 74 While this
distinction between statutory status and the exercise of discretion forms a
tidy argument, it overlooks the fact that the regulation violates the spirit of
the past persecution ground for refugee status by rendering a grant of
asylum virtually impossible for many victims of the more atrocious forms
of past persecution (such as forced sterilization and FGM), who often fall
169 See generally In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312 (BIA 1998) (Board
Member Lory Rosenberg, dissenting) (arguing that the majority grossly
mischaracterizes the nature of the past persecution presumption by labeling it an
evidentiary tool).
170 See, e.g., UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 136 (noting that, "even
though there may have been a change of regime in his country, this may not always
produce a complete change in the attitude of the population, nor, in view of his
experiences, in the mind of the refugee").
'' See generally Mcllmail, supra note 66, at 272 (arguing that, where past
persecution does not give rise to a substantial probability of similar treatment in the
future, the past persecution ground constitutes a form of "compensation" rather
than refuge).
172 See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,126 (Dec. 6, 2000).
173 id.
171 See McIlmail, supra note 66, at 273.
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within the refugee definition. Moreover, Congress, only three years before
the promulgation of the regulation, expressed its will to provide remedies
to victims of forced sterilization and abortion through an amendment to the
INA classifying these practices as persecution. 7 ' A regulatory amendment
so dramatically narrowing the availability of asylum to these refugees of
special concern of Congress is at odds with the aims of the Act and hence,
arguably, ultra vires.
7 6
The harsh effects of the "fundamental change" rule, like those of the
N-M-A- "same source" requirement, are to some degree cushioned by
the broader, two-pronged humanitarian grant featured in the new asylum
regulation. The new "other serious harm" provision means that victims of
unrepeatable harms are not required to make a specific showing concerning
the atrocious or severe nature of the mutilation they suffered--the showing
the INS sought in C-Y-Z-to require of refugees seeking a humanitarian
grant of asylum based on forced sterilization. However, even if adjudicators
do, in keeping with the new wording of the humanitarian ground, construe
it more broadly than the comparable provision in the 1990 regulation, this
mechanism cannot compensate for the underlying incompatibility of the re-
worded past persecution ground with both international human rights
instruments and Congress' desire to protect victims of unrepeatable harms.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE AND THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
The impact of regime change on an alien's prospect of persecution if
returned to her country of origin often plays a decisive role in asylum
adjudications today. The growing emphasis placed on country condition
reports in past persecution cases results both from the political turbulence
marking asylum source countries in the last decade, and from N-M-A-'s
rule that a past persecution-based asylum claim may be invalidated upon a
showing that the applicant no longer fears persecution from the same
source. In this environment, many scholars have evaluated the propriety of
asylum adjudicators' use of administrative notice to gain information on
political conditions in applicants' countries of origin-information which
in many cases determines the outcome of the asylum adjudication. 7
'75 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1997).
'
76 See id. § 208(d)(5)(B) (permitting the Attorney General to impose additional
restrictions on asylum only to the extent consistent with the Act).
177 See generally Tome, supra note 10 (arguing that the use of administrative
notice triggers procedural due process concerns, and that affording advance
warning and a pre-hearing opportunity to rebut noticed facts best serves the due
AN ENDURING FEAR
Judicial notice and administrative notice, while both permitting the
consideration of non-evidentiary facts, differ significantly in their scope.
While judicial notice is limited to facts that are" 'obvious,' 'notorious,' and
'capable of certain verification,'" administrative law judges may take
notice of more nuanced facts-facts that are "obvious and notorious" only
to a specialist in the field.'78 Several rationales undergird the different rules
for administrative notice. First, since agencies are specialized bodies,
administrative law judges grow familiar with factual issues that would be
considered obscure in lay contexts; they may be permitted to "assume"
facts that would not be apparent to an observer outside the area.'79 Second,
some commentators argue that the use of administrative notice helps
agencies function more efficiently. Since they encounter similar factual
issues with great regularity, agency adjudicators may simplify their jobs
and work more quickly by taking notice of facts that have become apparent
to them as experts. 8 ' As a corollary of this argument, a Ninth Circuit judge
noted somewhat drolly that the doctrine of administrative notice allows IJs
to stay awake during hearings: if they were not permitted to take notice of
familiar facts, they would be flooded with redundant facts throughout the
day.' Finally, administrative notice inures to the benefit of the public;
administrative law judges are not passive, but instead have the duty "to
investigate independently matters of concern to the parties."' 8 2 Under this
rationale, asylum applicants are among the chief beneficiaries of the
doctrine. Applicants frequently do not have access to information about
conditions in the country of origin that might in fact support their case, and
the IJ may serve as their advocate by taking notice of these facts.
process rights of asylum-seekers); Margulies, supra note 141 (arguing that the use
of administrative notice to give outcome-determinative weight to human rights
reports conflicts with the asylum-seeker's right to an individualized adjudication);
ANKER, supra note 28, at 112-50 (1999) (evaluating the use of the administrative
'notice mechanism under both constitutional and international human rights
standards). Because of the wealth of commentary on administrative notice in the
asylum adjudication, this Part of the Note seeks merely to highlight the relevance
of the issue to the new limitations on the past persecution ground discussed above.
178 Tome, supra note 10, at 418.
179 Id. at 415.
1
80 Id.
181 See Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that "officials may find it very hard to listen attentively after the first dozen or two
repetitions").
182 Tome, supra note 10, at 417.
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A. The Uses and Limits of Administrative Notice
Administrative notice may be used in several stages of the asylum
adjudication process. First, an IJ may take notice of improvements in
human rights conditions in the asylum applicant's country of origin that
have occurred since he or she fled the country. This use of administrative
notice effectively allows the IJ to fill the INS's burden of proof for it; the
agency's failure to bring such facts to light is not outcome-determinative.
At the appeal level, the BIA may take administrative notice of improve-
ments of country conditions intervening between the applicant's denial of
asylum by the IJ and the hearing of her case on appeal. The Board may find
the IJ's original ground for denial insufficient, but deny on the alternative
basis of changed country conditions without notifying the applicant of its
reliance on these new facts.183 In addition, upon noticing improved country
conditions, the Board may reverse an IJ's decision to grant asylum or
remand a granted case to the IJ for further fact-finding. 84 The use of
administrative notice by the BIA is particularly problematic in cases in
which, after an applicant timely filed an appeal from the IJ's order of
deportation or removal, the applicant's case languishes for years before
being reviewed by the BIA.'85 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Kowalczyk
v. /NS-a particularly dramatic case of delay in which the BIA took notice
of facts occurring nine years after the applicant's timely appeal of his
deportation order-indicates that delay is a relevant consideration for the
federal appellate court in determining whether the BIA's use of administra-
tive notice constitutes a procedural due process violation. '86 In that case, the
court found a due proces violation and reversed the deportation order.'
Past persecution cases, as well, often raise serious concerns about the
fairness of administrative notice, since the INS bears the burden of proof
for establishing that the conditions giving rise to the applicant's have
improved.'88
183 See ANKER, supra note 28, at 112.
184 id.
181 See Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F. 3d 1143, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the BIA violated alien's due process rights by taking administrative notice of
facts relating to changes in the Polish government in the decade since the alien had
left Poland; these facts did not exist until nine years after the applicant had filed his
timely appeal to the BIA).
186 Sd.
187 id.
18 See ANKER, supra note 28, at 113 n. 137.
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The BIA must observe two limits on its use of the administrative notice
mechanism: one constitutional, the other prudential. On the constitutional
level, deportation and removal proceedings must conform to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.189 While aliens' rights in these
settings do not encompass all the elements of a formal trial-indeed, aliens
never even have the opportunity to appear before the BIA when it reviews
deportation and removal orders against them' 90 -they do possess the core
due process rights ensured in most administrative hearings, such as the right
to an individualized adjudication and the right to rebut evidence presented
against them.19' Although the INA and not the Administrative Procedures
Act ("APA") governs asylum adjudications, appeals courts have based
procedural due process findings in asylum hearings on factually similar
APA cases.192 The question of the propriety of administrative notice in
asylum adjudications often reaches the federal courts through procedural
due process challenges.
Second, the agency must observe certain "prudential" rules derived
chiefly from factors articulated by administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp
Davis.1 93 Davis divides the universe of facts that of which agencies may
take notice into the adjudicative, legislative, and judgmental categories.
Legislative facts involve broad and verifiable statements about the political
189 See Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1977). Since the implemen-
tation of IIRIRA in 1997 as well, federal courts have found that removal pro-
ceedings trigger the right to a full and fair hearing under the Due Process Clause.
See Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2000).
190 Tome, supra note 10, at 426 (noting that asylum applicants do not have the
opportunity to present testimony or make oral arguments before the BIA; therefore,
applicants are not present to contest or rebut the use of administrative notice of
changed country conditions).
191 On the right to an individualized adjudication in the administrative law con-
text, see Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983). On the right to rebut a noticed
fact with outcome-determinative effect, see Banks v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 637, 641
(9th Cir. 1981). Applying these concepts to the deportation/removal context, see
Ulloa v. INS, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Board must give
asylum applicants a "meaningful opportunity to respond to officially noticed facts
that bear on the Board's decision-making process").
'92 See Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
INA displaces the APA in governing the procedural aspects of deportation, but that
the applicant possesses a right to rebut administratively noticed adjudicative facts
in both asylum cases and cases under the APA).
193 See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
931 (1980).
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or social situation of the asylum applicant's country of origin.' 94 For
example, administrative notice of a regime change is a legislative fact.
Adjudicative facts are particular to the applicant and usually more salient
to the merits of his or her asylum application.'95 "Judgmental facts" are
those "mixed with judgement, policy ideas, opinion, discretion, or
philosophical preference."' 96 While courts generally notice only legislative
facts, agencies may take notice of both legislative and adjudicative facts.
A pivotal Ninth Circuit case, Castillo-Villagra v. !NS,'97 noted that the
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts is often blurred when
the BIA takes notice of changed country conditions in asylum
proceedings.' 9 Alone this is a legislative fact, but the BIA and IJs
frequently extrapolate from such facts to conclude that the individual
asylum applicant no longer faces a well-founded fear of persecution.' 99 This
deduction, which might be characterized as a judgmental fact, forms the
most controversial element of the use of administrative notice in asylum
hearings, since it often poses a threat to the applicant's right to an
individualized adjudication.
B. The Dangers ofAdministrative Notice
As one commentator notes, the rationales behind administrative notice
in the asylum context are arguably less persuasive than in other administra-
tive law settings.2"0 First, the assumption of agency expertise is tenuous in
asylum cases, because judges would need to possess an encyclopedic
knowledge of human rights conditions around the globe to be true
"experts." The BIA, the highest reviewing body available in some asylum
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See Tome, supra note 10, at 418, citing KENNETH C. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.3, at 169 (2d ed. 1980).
'97 Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1017 (citing Davis, supra note 193, at 932
(setting forth the following factors for courts to consider in concluding whether
administrative notice of facts is proper: 1) Is the fact narrow or broad? 2) Is it
central or peripheral to the case? 3) Is it readily accepted or controversial? 3) Is the
noticed item purely factual or somewhat policy-driven? 4) Is the noticed fact
provable? 5) Is the fact about the parties or unrelated to the parties?)).
'98 Id. at 1027.
199 Id.
200 See Tome, supra note 10, at 436 (arguing that Js lack the resources or
expertise to make informed deductions about country conditions).
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cases, is specialized in U.S. immigration law-not in the human rights
conditions in asylum applicants' countries of origin.2"' In a series of cases
addressing the asylum claims of Eastern European nationals, the BIA
utilized State Department reports of free and fair elections as wholesale
disproof of applicants' fear of persecution in these countries. 212 This
reliance on broad reports of country conditions suggests that administrative
notice may sometimes foster inattention to the complex realities of life "on
the ground" in countries experiencing political upheaval.
Second, and more critically, over-expansive use of the administrative
notice mechanism undercuts aliens' due process rights. One commentator
argues that noticing potentially outcome-determinative facts without
affording an opportunity for rebuttal constitutes an unjustified procedure
under the Mathews v. Eldridge due process analysis.20 3 The author notes
that the private interest involved-potential deportation-is of the direst
nature, and that the potential for erroneous deprivation involved in the
adjudication when the IJ does not confront evidence challenging a noticed
fact outweighs the governmental interest in administrative efficiency and
speedy removal of aliens' due process rights.20 4 Similarly, in the interna-
tional law context, the Handbook states that adjudicators of refugee status
"are not required to pass judgment on conditions in the applicant's country
of origin," but instead should view these as a "relevant background
situation" in which to situate the facts of the applicant's claim.205 Use of
human rights reports to assess the claims of all members of a national-
origin group jeopardizes these protections, and risks ignoring the key
factors that Judge Posner characterized as "specific, perhaps local, dangers
to particular, perhaps obscure, individuals. 20 6 The extreme diversity of
asylum-seekers' backgrounds, narratives, and fears does not lend itself
readily to group classifications based on highly general U.S. government
and nonprofit organization reports.
2 ' Id. at 440. See also ANKER, supra note 28, at 119 (commenting that even the
BIA does not justify its own use of administrative notice on the basis of specialized
foreign affairs trainings).
202 See Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001); Subramian v.
District Director, U.S. INS, Denver, Colo., 724 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1989).
203 See Tome, supra note 10, at 462-63. On the test for determining when an
agency practice constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty or property unwarranted by
the Due Process Clause, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).204 Id.
205 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 42.
206 Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (2000).
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C. Federal Courts 'Mechanismsfor Reviewing the Use ofAdministrative
Notice
A majority of the federal circuits have implemented mechanisms to
ensure that the BIA's use of administrative notice does not violate asylum
applicants' rights to an individualized adjudication. First, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuit holdings represent three ways of scrutinizing the agency
procedure. The First Circuit has taken a substantive approach, holding that
the BIA may not take administrative notice of legislative facts, such as
changed country conditions, in support of the INS's burden of rebuttal,
unless it engages in an individualized assessment of the impact of these
facts on the asylum applicant's fear of persecution." 7 For example, in
Fergiste v. INS, the First Circuit held that the the BIA violated an appli-
cant's procedural due process rights when it noticed a State Department
report indicating that Aristide returned to power in Haiti as outcome-
determinative evidence that the applicant no longer faced a well-founded
fear of persecution.20 8 In that case, the court found that where the only
evidence to support the INS's position was U.S. State Department country
reports and where the applicant had presented hundreds of pages of
documentary evidence supporting a continuing fear of persecution, the BIA
exceeded its discretion by finding that changed country conditions negated
the applicant's well-founded fear.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has drawn on procedural
mechanisms to regulate the use of administrative notice--a complex
approach fully elucidated in Castillo-Villagra v. INS.2" 9 In that case, the
BIA used administrative notice of President Violeta Chamorro's election
in Nicaragua to conclude that the applicants no longer feared persecution
from the Sandinistas.21 ° The Court held that in some circumstances asylum
applicants must be given advance notice of the facts of which the BIA
intends to take administrative notice. The applicant must also be given an
opportunity to rebut these facts.2 1' Whether notice to the applicant and an
opportunity to rebut must be afforded is an ad hoc decision to be made on
the basis of the factors the court borrowed from Professor Davis' categori-
zation of noticed facts.212 While the agency is not required to give the alien
207 See generally Tome, supra note 10, at 450-56 (contrasting substantive and
procedural approaches).
208 See Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1998).
209 See Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992).
21°ld. at 1018.
211 Id. at 1025.
212 See supra note 197.
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warning that it plans to take notice of common knowledge facts, it must
warn the alien if it plans to apply these legislative facts to the specifics of
the alien's claim; such was the case in Castillo- Villagra.2" 3 The Court held
that the availability of a motion to reopen is not sufficient to protect the
alien's due process rights. Because the motion is discretionary, it does not
guarantee the alien the right to rebut facts salient to her case.214 This stance
differs from that of the First, Fifth, Seventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits, which hold that the motion to reopen is sufficient to protect the
alien's due process rights.2" 5
Recent cases indicate, however, that the Ninth Circuit has departed
from its purely procedural approach. In Rios v. Ashcroft, the court held that
the BIA may not find that the INS has met its burden of rebuttal solely on
the basis of a U.S. State Department Country Report suggesting improved
human rights conditions.21 6 In another recent case, the court held that the
BIA must conduct an individualized inquiry based on the noticed facts,
inquiring how the applicant's fate, if she were returned to the country of
origin, might differ from that of those similarly situated who never fled
persecution.2"7
The Seventh Circuit, rather than focusing on which facts the agency
may notice or whether it must provide applicants with the opportunity to
rebut, emphasizes the weight the agency may permissibly accord to the
noticed facts. The Seventh Circuit rejects the procedural approach, holding
that the agency is not obligated to provide the applicant with the opportu-
nity to rebut noticed facts; the motion to reopen, it holds, is sufficient to
protect due process rights.2"' Instead, as the Galina case demonstrates, the
Seventh Circuit focuses on whether the facts have particular relevance to
the individual applicant.21 9 Facts of general applicability (such as broad
statements in State Department reports) may not be given outcome-
determinative weight; they alone may not serve to fill the INS's burden of
rebuttal. 220 The general or particular applicability analysis appears,
213 Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1029.
214 Id. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have also held that advance warning is
required in some circumstances. See Ulloa v. INS, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991);
Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 1999).
215 See Kazmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 1991); Gebremichael
v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 1993); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 967 (5th
Cir. 1991); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
216 See Rios v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
217 See Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2001).
218 See Kazmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597.
219 See Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000).
220 Id.
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ultimately, identical to the distinction between legislative and adjudicative
facts espoused in the First and Ninth Circuits.
The substantive approach in the final analysis may provide greater
protection to aliens, since it does not rely on the applicant to rebut facts that
she may not have the resources or knowledge to refute. On the other hand,
the procedural approach allows the well-informed applicant to draw on the
advantage of an intimate knowledge of political conditions in her country
of origin to demonstrate the inaccuracy of generalized statements of human
rights improvements. The current trend in the federal appeals courts toward
scrutinizing the use of administrative notice in asylum adjudications bodes
well for the future protection of aliens' procedural due process rights.
When not carefully applied, the administrative notice mechanism may
overemphasize U.S. State Department assessments of country conditions
to the exclusion of a close consideration of the alien's case. Because such
reports have the tendency, as Judge Posner notes, to "look on the bright
side" regarding countries with which the United States has friendly
relations, over-reliance on human rights reports may infuse a biased
political factor into the asylum adjudication and prevent the individualized
inquiry demanded by the Constitution and international human rights
instruments.
221
VI. CONCLUSION
As implemented in the United States, the past persecution ground for
asylum straddles a paradox. It respects the legacy of prior harms by creating
a presumption that the applicant continues to fear similar treatment. At the
same time, however, government-inflicted harms occur most often in
countries whose political and social climates are characterized by constant
upheaval. Assuming any constant-including a constant source or form of
government mistreatment-implies a degree of predictability rarely found
in countries with poor human rights records. This irony makes clear that the
past persecution presumption is ultimately a humanitarian fiction,
permitting the U.S. to offer asylum to refugees whose past victimization
suggests a significant threat of future persecution, but who may not meet
the "well-founded fear" test articulated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.222
Over the last decade, several compelling influences--4he dizzying rate
of regime change around the world, the rise in asylum claims in the United
States, 223 and national security concerns provoked by terrorist threats-
221 See id. at 957.
222 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see supra note 4.
223 See supra note 73.
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have led policymakers to depart from the humanitarian underpinnings of
international refugee law and to view the past persecution presumption as
an evidentiary tool. Both the N-M-A- "same source" rule and the
reworded "fundamental change" provision of the 2000 asylum regulation
reflect a trend toward devaluing the impact of past harms and oversimplify-
ing the landscape of human rights conditions in applicants' countries of
origin. These two new developments reflect faltering attention to the spirit
of the international refugee instruments at a timewhen concern for human
rights crises around the world is more critical than ever. Exacerbating the
effect of these new restrictions on asylum eligibility, expansive application
of the administrative notice mechanism threatens the very foundation of the
asylum inquiry in the United States: an individualized assessment of the
alien's risk of harm if returned to her home country. The impact of these
trends is presently hard to assess, since the extent to which they limit the
availability of asylum to victims of past persecution depends in part upon
how broadly IJs construe the new "other serious harms" humanitarian grant
in the asylum regulation. A return to the past persecution provisions
contained in the 1990 regulations, however, would ensure greater compli-
ance with both international human rights principles and the purposes of
the INA's past persecution ground.
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